PARIS
— And now, Frexit? For the French, the most visible consequence of the
Brexit referendum is the return of Marine Le Pen. In February the leader
of the far-right National Front stated on her blog that she wanted to
“take a break” to “think about the future of the country and nurture a
project.” After that she conspicuously retreated from the mainstream
media.
As
soon as the result of the British vote was announced on June 24,
though, Ms. Le Pen was back with a vengeance and a huge grin. Everywhere
to be seen, she used Twitter to call for a French referendum on the European Union, held a news conference and met with President François Hollande
at the Élysée Palace, along with leaders of the other political
parties, to discuss Brexit. She even popped up in Brussels to pour scorn
on the European Union from the benches of the European Parliament,
which she despises so deeply yet finds so useful as a bully pulpit.
Anticipating the possibility of victory for the Leave camp, the National Front had posters on hand proclaiming, “And now, France?”
In the current tense domestic and global situation, with a presidential
election only 10 months away, Ms. Le Pen’s party, which got 28 percent
of the vote in the regional poll held last December, couldn’t have
dreamed of such a godsend.
But
France doesn’t seem to be ready for Ms. Le Pen’s Frexit dream. A TNS
Sofres poll taken in the immediate aftermath of the British vote and
published on June 29 showed that less than half of the electorate, 45
percent, would favor holding such a referendum. If it were held, 45
percent of French voters would have chosen Remain and 33 percent would
have voted Leave. Three days later, after giving it cooler thought, 55
percent of French voters rejected the idea of a referendum, according to
a C.S.A. poll, and the Remain camp had grown to 61 percent. These
figures don’t reflect a revolt on the scale of the British one. Until
late June, Frexit was not even part of the public debate.
These
numbers, of course, could change, and Ms. Le Pen will make the most of
Britain’s decision. But if the British exit process turns ugly or simply
drags on in a messy way, it may just as likely backfire against her.
The
gamble that Ms. Le Pen is making is that neither she nor anybody else
at the moment knows how deep a shock the Brexit vote represents for the
French. Will it be seen as part of the general revolt against the
effects of globalization, growing inequality, uncontrolled migration and
the arrogance of the elites? Or will Britain’s choice also be felt as
an existential threat to the European idea and, therefore, to French
identity?
Because
France has had such a crucial role in creating the European Union, this
second dimension should not be underestimated. Whether from the right
or the left, postwar French leaders have constantly pushed to take
Europe further. Europe, in the French vision, is not only an ideal: It
is an instrument of power on the world scene. Ever since France first
became a great power in the 13th century, it has had the ambition to
remain one. After World War II, France saw Europe as a way to access
power again. General Charles de Gaulle got France a permanent seat on
the United Nations Security Council and made it a nuclear power, but the
European construction brought it two more benefits: size — which
mattered in a bipolar world — and a reining in of that other formidable
European power, Germany.
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As
early as 1950, two Frenchmen, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, had
advanced the idea of a European entity built on common industrial
interests and an embrace of a reborn Germany. The Suez fiasco in 1956
made France and Britain painfully aware of their military weakness.
While London then thought it wiser to seek closer cooperation with its
close American ally, De Gaulle chose the other way, the European way. To
achieve what he called a “European Europe,” he proceeded to
institutionalize a strengthened Franco-German relationship as the
nucleus of this new Continental system. Britain, kept on the sidelines,
was able to join what was then the Common Market only after De Gaulle
was gone.
Stage
by stage, Europe took shape, attracting more and more member states.
And at every stage, the Franco-German tandem, the famous “engine” of
Europe, was operating behind the scenes.
But
in its core identity, Europe had three pillars: France, Germany and
Britain. For France, Britain fulfilled another role, as a privileged
partner in its strategic vision of the world. Much has been said about
London as an ally for Berlin in its free-market economic vision of the
European Union. But for Paris, having London as a diplomatic and
military power inside the European Union was equally important. Unlike
Germany, France and Britain do not shy from a sense of mission in the
world, including military intervention.
With
Brexit, one of the three pillars is gone. At the top of the European
Union’s remaining 27 members, France will now face an uneasy tête-à-tête
with Germany at a time when the economic imbalance between the two
countries puts Paris at a dramatic disadvantage.
How
will this development play out in the French psyche? In the collective
soul-searching that has begun within the European Union after the Brexit
earthquake, a strong emphasis has rightly been put on the bloc’s
austerity policies and on Brussels’ encroachments. Now comes the naked
truth: For the past 10 years, the European Union has failed to deliver
on the main objective it was set up to achieve: shielding its citizens
from insecurity. Over the past few days, European leaders, in a state of
shock, have hastily identified three priorities on which to focus if
they want to save their union: security, migration and economic growth.
This
is a good start, but something is still missing. Well-known divisions
among the 27 over these issues will be overcome only if European
citizens regain a sense of the political and historical mission of the
European idea. Why are they together? The level of emotions expressed in
Europe in reaction to the British vote has shown that the feeling of
belonging to a common entity, or of being excluded from it, is
surprisingly strong, notably in the young generation. Maybe that can
even look like something called a European identity. Maybe a new
political idea, more attuned to 21st-century realities, can even be
built upon that identity. This will be the best way to counter Ms. Le
Pen’s argument that Europe is a “prison of the peoples.”
Credit: Newyork times
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